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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has moved to tighten subsea cable regulations, adopting rules that both accelerate decision‑making on cable projects and sharply restrict access by ‘foreign adversaries’

Announced on 7 August, the measures create a formal ‘presumption of denial’ for cable‑landing licence applications from entities controlled by designated foreign adversaries and ban the use of equipment listed on the FCC’s Covered List in submarine cable systems that land in or otherwise connect to the United States. According to the agency, the aim is to narrow a strategic vulnerability in global communications infrastructure without imposing an extra‑territorial ban on equipment used entirely outside US jurisdiction.

The new rules tighten and clarify long‑running national‑security concerns about undersea cables. The FCC’s Covered List identifies specific vendors and classes of equipment deemed to pose unacceptable security risks; under the August decision, use of that ‘covered’ kit on US‑connected systems is effectively prohibited. The Commission framed the changes as both a screening mechanism and a deterrent: applications from companies with foreign‑adversary control will now face a default refusal unless they can overcome that presumption.

Work to update the submarine cable regulations had been ongoing since last year, with the FCC formally announcing that it was considering banning equipment from the likes of Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom and China Mobile last month.

“We have seen submarine cable infrastructure threatened in recent years by foreign adversaries, like China,” said FCC Chairman Brendan Carr in a statement on Thursday. “We are therefore taking action here to guard our submarine cables against foreign adversary ownership, and access as well as cyber and physical threats.”

The Commission is also seeking public comment on a set of complementary proposals designed to shore up resilience in practice. These include incentives for the use of US‑flagged repair and maintenance vessels, programmes to promote “trusted technology abroad,” and potentially narrowing the ‘Team Telecom’ review for genuinely low‑risk applications that meet high security standards. Team Telecom is shorthand for the handful of US government agencies that oversee foreign investment into US and advise the FCC on whether investors represent a national security risk; it typically includes representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DoD).

The agency says the measures will make approval processes for subsea cable landings more efficient while imposing clearer security tests. On the other hand, they trigger reciprocal measures and a new round of geoeconomic competition over who builds and sustains the world’s cables.

Washington’s hardening of policy comes in parallel with a growing Western push to bolster subsea resilience. The European Union in February set out an Action Plan on Cable Security that organises prevention, detection, and response to submarine cable damage by human agents. That plan, the EU says, prioritises ‘smart’ subsea cables equipped with sensors, as well as investing in new systems to increase redundancy and reduce single‑point failures for subsea data traffic.